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Abstract
China’s national leaders see restructuring and diversification away from
resource-based, energy intensive industries as central goals in the coming
years. On the basis of extensive fieldwork in China between 2010 and
2012, we suggest that the high turnover of leading cadres at the local level
may hinder state-led greening growth initiatives. Frequent cadre turnover
is intended primarily to keep local Party secretaries and mayors on the
move in order to promote the implementation of central directives. While
rotation does seem to aid implementation by reducing coordination pro-
blems, there are also significant downsides to local leaders changing office
every three to four years. Officials with short time horizons are likely to
choose the path of least resistance in selecting quick, low-quality approaches
to the implementation of environmental policies. We conclude that the per-
verse effects of local officials’ short time horizons give reason to doubt the
more optimistic claims about the advantages of China’s model of environ-
mental authoritarianism.
Keywords: authoritarian environmentalism; cadre rotation; environmental
policy implementation; China; leadership; time horizons
In light of wealthy democracies’ generally lacklustre responses to global environ-
mental crises, the question of whether authoritarian regimes might make better
environmental managers has attracted attention in recent years.1 In the face of
a rapidly unfolding climate change crisis, advanced democracies have often
seemed flat-footed – paralysed by interminable negotiations at the international
level and the ceaseless pressure of lobby groups and high-consuming voters at
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home. In contrast, authoritarian regimes are seen as potentially more nimble and
capable. The combination of a higher degree of state autonomy and a society
habituated to the exercise of coercive power may confer certain advantages on
“eco-elites” in non-democracies.2 China’s rapid advances in environmental pro-
tection have made it a focal point of debate over the relative merits of democratic
and authoritarian environmentalism.3 Proponents of China’s approach admire its
state leaders’ ability to compel businesses and citizens to comply with stringent
environmental regulations. Chinese authoritarians’ toolkits contain many
more, and sharper, implements to elicit such compliance. For instance, many
energy-inefficient companies that failed to comply with demanding energy effi-
ciency regulations have found their electricity and water supply summarily cut
off by local governments. In contrast to politicians in democracies who, heavily
constrained by electoral cycles, weigh the cost of environmental protection in
terms of lost votes, authoritarian leaders are potentially better environmental
stewards, so the story goes, as they are comparatively insulated from societal
pressure and can take the long view on environmental issues.
This article casts a critical eye on optimistic claims about China’s authoritarian
advantage. While national leaders in Beijing have committed to addressing
China’s environmental crisis, local leaders, who bear responsibility for interpret-
ing and carrying out environmental policies, typically have very short time hor-
izons and are not strongly incentivized to take on the difficult business of
changing lanes from a growth-at-any-cost model to a resource-efficient and sus-
tainable path.4 While there are some advantages of cadre rotation for environ-
mental policy implementation, our research highlights the negative and
unintended consequences of a system that keeps local officials on the move.
The immense pressure of a short term in office, during which time leaders
must produce results to be considered for promotion, incentivizes local leaders
to select highly visible projects that deliver outcomes during their own tenure per-
iods, while long-term complex initiatives are often sidelined.
The findings presented here are based on extensive fieldwork carried out
between 2010 and 2012. During the first phase of research in 2010 and 2011, cov-
ering a period of five months, the authors studied variation in cadre turnover and
its impact on environmental policy implementation in five municipalities and 11
counties in Shanxi province. Shanxi is an appropriate choice since leaders’ efforts
2 Shearman and Smith 2007.
3 Gilley 2012.
4 At the national level, environmental protection and resource and energy security have taken a place on
the core political agenda. China’s two most recent national five-year plans, the 11th (2006–2010) and
12th (2011–2015), outline Beijing’s ambitious vision for moving towards a more sustainable,
environmentally-friendly growth path. The 11th Five-Year Plan identified conservation, efficient use
of resources and economic transformation in the interests of sustainable development as key national
policies. The 12th Five-Year Plan has added substance to these concepts by establishing the shift to
higher value-added manufacturing, improvement of energy and resource conservation and expansion
of the service sector as key goals. “Hard,” meaning restricted (yueshuxing), and “soft” or expected
(yuqixing) targets have been incorporated in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans as incentives for
local cadres.
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to diversify away from heavy reliance on the coal industry and embark on a
“green rise” (lüse jueqi 绿色崛起) offer critical insights into the opportunities
and challenges on the road ahead for the country as a whole. The empirical sec-
tion also draws on two months of fieldwork on the same topic in Hunan and
Shandong provinces in 2012. In total, the authors conducted 89 interviews (45 in
Shanxi, 26 in Hunan and 18 in Shandong). The majority of interviews were held
with leading officials in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Organization
Department, environmental protection bureaus (EPB), Development and Reform
Commission (DRC) and Economic Commission. Interviews were also conducted
with industrial enterprise managers involved in economic transformation pro-
grammes. Findings are also based on government reports provided in interviews,
as well as local gazetteers and media accounts.
The Rationale and Policy Impact of High Cadre Turnover
China’s local officials gather no moss. Most government leadership positions at
county and municipal levels are for a prescribed term of five years, yet only a
small minority of leading officials actually serve out these terms in full. The
majority move on to the next position within three to four years. In the context
of China’s complex central–local relations, central authorities have long viewed
the periodic rotation of local officials as a tool to enhance the control and mon-
itoring of local officials. While these comprise the core goals behind the tangle of
regulations and informal practices that govern official post-switching, a number
of auxiliary aims related to cadre training, diffusion of local policy innovations
and bridging administrative gaps have been woven into the system in recent
years. Despite the evident importance which China’s leaders attach to this sys-
tem, surprisingly little research has been done on whether high cadre turnover
actually delivers its intended benefits.
Available data suggest that the two pillars of local leadership groups (lingdao
banzi 领导班子) – Party secretaries and mayors – are typically whisked off to a
new locale well before the recommended five-year term for civil servants and
Party cadres in leadership positions.5 Cadre turnover takes the form of promo-
tion, lateral rotation and, much less frequently, demotion.6 Short-term appoint-
ments are also common in China’s cadre management system, whereby
officials are temporarily stationed in a particular department or locality for a
short period (such cadres are known as guazhi 挂职). Data on 898 former
5 The five-year tenure limit is, in reality, a firm recommendation rather than a hard and fast rule. A 1999
CCP Organization Department document set ten years as the absolute limit for cadres in leading posi-
tions, but rules stating that cadres should change positions at five-year intervals are phrased in the lan-
guage of “should” (yinggai) rather than “must” (bixu). This flexibility explains why some cadres have
tenures longer than five years.
6 The post-switching of leading cadres takes place via two systems, both of which are managed ultimately
by the CCP Organization Department. The cadre selection and appointment system (lingdao ganbu
xuanba renyong zhidu) handles promotion and demotion decisions for leading cadres, while the cadre
rotation system (ganbu jiaoliu zhidu) applies to cadre flows between positions of equal rank.
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municipal Party secretaries appointed across China between 1993 and 2011 reveal
that the average time in office was 3.8 years, with a minimum tenure of 0.2 years
and a maximum of 12.8 years;7 23 per cent of municipal Party secretaries spent
two years or less in their positions, while only 25 per cent stayed for five years or
more. Previous work has found that mayors at county and municipal levels also
tend to serve between three and four years before moving on to their next assign-
ment.8 Beyond the leadership group, departmental heads with a key role in envir-
onmental policy implementation also rotate, on average, every four years.9
Evidence suggests that the trend is towards faster rotation of local officials.
There has been a significant drop in average tenure time over the last two dec-
ades. While in the 1990s average tenure length was 4.2 years and more than 35
per cent of the 898 municipal Party secretaries surveyed served longer than five
years, between 2002 and 2011 average tenure dropped to 3.3 years and less
than 14 per cent stayed beyond five years. Landry’s analysis of the average tenure
times of 2,058 municipal mayors serving between 1990 and 2001 is even more
striking as it suggests that tenure times steadily declined from an average of
3.2 years in the 1990s to 2.5 years by 2001.10
Policy origins of high cadre turnover
This churning of local leaders is largely a legacy of the Deng-era leadership’s
interest in strengthening the centre’s levers of control over the localities. As
part of a broad effort to rebuild the cadre management system in the early reform
period after 1978, the central leadership strove to place limits on local cadres’
incentives and opportunities to engage in localism by keeping them away from
their home turf and on the move. Central leaders sought, first, to revive the
imperial Rule of Avoidance (huibi zhidu 回避制度), which directs cadres away
from holding office in their places of origin. References to the Rule of
Avoidance began to reappear in policy documents after 1978, and the terms
have been gradually clarified and hardened over time.11 The Central
Organization Department’s 1999 “Interim measures for the rotation of Party
and government leading cadres”12 significantly broadened the scope of avoidance
by stipulating that leading cadres in key Party and government positions should
not serve in their ancestral homes, places of birth or in the places where they grew
7 The source is the authors’ database of biographic information for 898 municipal Party secretaries and
124 provincial departmental heads.
8 Seckington 2007, 19; Mei 2009, 102.
9 For instance, the average time served as head of a provincial DRC, the head of a provincial EPB and the
head of a provincial construction bureau was 3.56 years, 4.00 years and 4.60 years, respectively (Kostka
2013). As discussed below, the frequent rotation of directors in functional departments can be disruptive
to local development planning. However, while leading cadres are frequently rotated, ordinary cadres
are not, meaning that standard administrative tasks will continue despite leadership changes.
10 Landry 2008, 90.
11 Mei 2009, 49.
12 Communist Party of China Central Committee Organization Department. 1999. “Dangzheng lingdao
ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo zanxing guiding.”
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up (although exceptions may be granted in autonomous regions for ethnic minor-
ities). To combat problems of nepotism, the policy also stated that leading cadres
must not be married to nor have any direct blood relations with other cadres
working in the same organization.
The central control rationale also informed the leadership’s calls for restoring
the practice of periodic leadership rotation on the principle that “flowing water
does not get stale, a door hinge is never worm-eaten” (liushui bu fu, hushu bu
du 流水不腐, 户枢不蠹). Prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution, there
existed an official rotation system that mandated the exchange of senior cadres
in central and provincial Party and government organs, as well as leading cadres
in municipal and county levels.13 Previous work has argued that, after 1978,
reviving the rotation system was a key move in the centre’s largely successful
efforts to enhance its control and monitoring of local agents.14 The control
logic is that a leading cadre stationed in a post for no longer than five years is
less likely, all else being equal, to side with local interests against the centre’s
demands than a leader who has long-standing ties to the area. Frequent cadre
turnover is thought to enhance monitoring, since each changing of the guard
represents an opportunity for the new leader to provide upper levels with inside
information on the predecessor’s reign.15
While control and monitoring constitute the core aims of the rotation system,
relevant policy documents now more often link cadre circulation to the broader
mandate of rejuvenating the cadre ranks and strengthening the state’s leadership
capacity, as emphasized in Deng’s “four transformations” (sihua 四化) reforms.
This emphasis on frequent post-switching as a method of cadre training is evident
in central and local policy documents, as well as in interviews with active and
retired officials. The first major policy document on cadre rotation, the Central
Organization Department’s 1990 “Decision on the implementation of the
exchange system of Party and government leading cadres,”16 characterizes the
main objectives of rotation in terms of cadre development and training, as well
as improving their overall “quality” (suzhi 素质). Of the various ways in which
rotation has been promoted in the name of cadre training, perhaps the most sig-
nificant practice is the temporary posting of cadres to gain experience (guazhi
duanlian 挂职锻炼).
Over time, policy documents and specific rotation programmes have increas-
ingly framed rotation as a means of reducing regional disparities and bridging
administrative gaps. Cadre rotation has come to be seen as a potential source
of assistance to less developed regions. The Central Organization Department’s
2000 document, “Outline for deepening cadre management reform,” calls for
greater “guidance on cadre exchange to difficult regions and difficult posts”
13 Zhong 2003, 117.
14 Huang 2002; Edin 2003.
15 Huang 2002, 72.
16 Communist Party of China Central Committee Organization Department. 1999. “Guanyu shixing dang
he guojia jiguan lingdao ganbu jiaoliu zhidu de jueding.”
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(yindao ganbu xiang jianku diqu he jianku gangwei jiaoliu引导干部向艰苦地区和
艰苦岗位交流).17 To that end, the policy advocates the intensification of east–
west cadre rotation schemes in support of the “open up the west” strategy
(xibu dakaifa zhanlüe西部大开发战略) and calls for cadres from central govern-
ment institutions and economically-developed eastern provinces to be temporar-
ily posted to western regions. Recent rotation schemes also increasingly envisage
cadre exchange as a means of bridging administrative hierarchies and institution-
al gulfs. For example, the 2006 Civil Servant Law states that leaders at and below
provincial rank should implement cross-regional, cross-department lateral trans-
fers (zhuanren 转任). Civil servants can be sent to lower or upper-level author-
ities, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or service organizations for short-term
training.
In sum, in addition to the core goal of monitoring and controlling local offi-
cials, numerous other supplementary aims of cadre rotation have been added
over the years. Cadre circulation is increasingly also seen as a way of improving
policy implementation through cadre training, the diffusion of policy innovation,
and bridging cleavages between departments, administrative hierarchies and
regions. However, there is scant research on how cadre rotation schemes affect
policy implementation processes and whether they actually deliver their intended
benefits.
The significance of cadre rotation for policy implementation
The length of term served by local officials is not the only factor relevant to pol-
icy implementation. In China, as elsewhere, policy implementation is a complex
process in which the dispositions and behaviour of local leaders constitute just
one piece of the puzzle; however, compared to their counterparts in most other
countries, powerful local leaders in China’s “decentralized authoritarian” system
make up a considerably larger piece of the implementation puzzle.18 It is for this
reason that we characterize high cadre turnover as an issue of considerable sig-
nificance for implementation processes and outcomes.
Although the comparative public policy implementation literature is based pri-
marily on examples drawn from democratic, federalist systems, it is useful in pro-
viding a broad outline of the factors relevant to China. Sabatier and
Mazmanian’s classic work groups a total of 17 variables bearing on policy imple-
mentation into three categories: “tractability of the problem;” “ability of statute
to structure implementation;” and “non-statutory variables affecting implemen-
tation.”19 Lester and Bowman’s statistical test of the Sabatier–Mazmanian
framework found that some of these variables had more reach than others in
17 Communist Party of China Central Committee Organization Department. 2000. “Shenhua ganbu renshi
zhidu gaige gangyao.”
18 Landry 2008.
19 Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980.
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explaining a pattern of state-level variation in implementation of the American
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976).20 Among the “tractability”
variables, they found that the difficulties of measuring and monitoring technical-
ly complex issues, as well as a high degree of economic importance in the target
group, made implementation less likely. In matters of organizational structure
(“statutory” variables), they found partial support for hypotheses positing that
bureaucratic fragmentation, the placement of implementation responsibility
with an “unsympathetic” agency, and state leaders’ ambivalence over policy
goals weakened implementation. Of particular relevance to this article, Lester
and Bowman found support for two “non-statutory” hypotheses related to polit-
ical leadership: “the greater the support of sovereigns, the more likely is imple-
mentation,” and “the greater the commitment and leadership skills of
implementing officials, the more likely is implementation.”21 Despite the obvious
differences between the American and Chinese systems, many of the factors iden-
tified here are relevant to China. The pathologies of fragmented bureaucracy, dif-
ficulties in monitoring less readily measurable complex environmental targets,
and official foot-dragging stemming from environment versus growth trade-offs,
are all problems familiar to scholars of Chinese environmental politics.
One aspect of the Chinese political system that is perhaps not so easily accom-
modated by the comparative literature on implementation is the expansive role and
broad powers of local leaders in the environmental policy implementation process.
Policies formulated at the central level generally articulate very broad aspirations,
the interpretation and implementation of which are left to the discretion of local
authorities. In this process, Party secretaries and mayors in the local leadership
group wield significant authority and influence over almost all major decisions
in a locality as they formulate interpretations of national directives, establish a
hierarchy of policy priorities and oversee the implementation process. Most
important matters, particularly economic and financial affairs, are decided by
the leadership group of a locality (either at the municipal or county level).
Within the leadership group, Party secretaries usually hold the pre-eminent
position and are seen as the first hand (yi ba shou一把手), while mayors are, ordin-
arily, the second hand (er ba shou二把手) and subordinate to the Party secretaries.
The centre’s typically loosely-worded environmental directives, coupled with
the broad-ranging powers of the local leadership group, and in particular the
Party secretary, give local leaders substantial room for manoeuvre in the imple-
mentation of directives from on high. Allowing local leaders such significant
flexibility to interpret central directives is seen as necessary in a country as
vast and diverse as China. The system is also designed to elicit creative local
experimentation, the most successful examples of which are designated as mod-
els to be promoted nationwide.22 Of course, flexibility has its price. Such room
20 Lester and Bowman 1989.
21 Ibid., 746.
22 Heilmann 2008.
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for manoeuvre, combined with a governance system that lacks thorough checks
and balances, can lend local leaders the opportunity to shirk on unpopular
initiatives and, generally, to engage in the “selective” implementation of
directives.23
The cadre responsibility and evaluation system is seen as the big stick used by
upper-level authorities to ensure implementation compliance from local leaders.
It is for this reason that studies of selective policy implementation in China have
so often focused on analysis of incentives embedded in the cadre responsibility
and evaluation system, especially bonus and promotion prospects. Economic,
social and environmental targets are built into this personnel incentive system
and used to evaluate and monitor the performance of public officials holding a
position in the Party or government.
Yet, as an accountability mechanism, the cadre responsibility and evaluation
system is not without its flaws. Presented with a menu of policy goals, ambitious
“street-level bureaucrats” tend to apportion their finite energy and resources to
those projects which they expect will boost their career prospects.24 While the
true basis upon which personnel decisions are made remains something of a
black box in the study of Chinese politics, we surmise that cadres strive to
enhance their chances of promotion through a combination of informal personal
relationship-building with decision makers and on-the-job efforts to deliver “pol-
itical accomplishments” (zhengji 政绩). Political accomplishment projects often
take the form of extravagant construction projects which draw resources away
from the implementation of more humdrum policies.25
Given that local leaders in China wield such considerable powers, establishing
the various effects of leaders’ brief tenures is, in turn, an aid to our understanding
of the complex process of implementing environmental policy. The existing litera-
ture has generally viewed cadre rotation in a favourable light. Huang found that
local officials with short tenures were more likely to comply with the centre’s
efforts to curb inflationary investment in periods of austerity.26 Edin’s analysis
of cadre turnover between township and county levels finds that the system
strengthens political control and helps to curb localism as it encourages town lea-
ders to identify more with the next administrative level rather than their own local
community.27
However, theoretical contributions to the field of political economy suggest
that leaders in authoritarian systems with short time horizons are an untrust-
worthy lot. Drawing from the historical example of Chinese warlords in the
Republic period, Olson famously argued that “roving” bandits aimed to maxi-
mize their plunder (via taxation) before sweeping on to the next locale. The
acquisitiveness of “stationary” bandits with no such outside options is, by
23 O’Brien and Li 1999.
24 Ibid.
25 Cai 2004.
26 Huang 1996.
27 Edin 2003, 48.
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contrast, more far-sighted and more moderate: “The rational stationary bandit
will take only a part of income in taxes, because he will be able to exact a larger
amount of income from his subjects if he leaves them with an incentive to gener-
ate income that he can tax.”28 The following section suggests that there are par-
allels to be found in the behaviour of some of China’s short-tenured officials and
Olson’s roving bandits.
Other studies underscore the significance of leaders’ time horizons in determin-
ing the level of state intervention in public policy and the provision of public
goods, both in democratic and autocratic systems.29 Dionne’s statistical study
of HIV/AIDS initiatives in 15 autocracies and democracies in Africa found
that leaders with a short time horizon are less likely to invest in AIDS public
health policies as they do not expect to be in power when AIDS problems emerge,
while leaders with longer time horizons intervene and invest more heavily in HIV
pandemic prevention.30 Wright argues that the time horizons of authoritarian
leaders shape how foreign aid funds are disbursed. Dictators secure in their
rule can take the long view and, in the manner of stationary bandits, have a
greater incentive to invest in public goods. Conversely, leaders preoccupied
with fighting off political rivals have shorter time horizons and, Wright argues,
tend to see foreign aid funds as a resource to be used to ensure their political sur-
vival by buying repression and political support, as well as a means of building
their personal wealth as insurance against possible regime change.31
In sum, the effects of high cadre turnover on policy implementation in China
are not well understood. Given the considerable powers of local officials in the
process of policy implementation, we would expect their frequent post-switching
to be a salient factor in shaping policy outcomes. However, findings in the exist-
ing literature point in opposite directions as to the nature of that effect. While
cadre rotation is seen by some as enhancing the prospects of local implementa-
tion of central directives, the above-cited comparative literature suggests that
short time horizons result in rapacious behaviour and underinvestment in public
policies and the provision of public goods. According to this line of thought, the
short time horizons of local leaders are likely to have significant negative, unin-
tended consequences as local leaders will shirk on the implementation of those
central directives which do not deliver significant particularistic benefits or
which cannot be realized within their own tenure. Policy areas that are particu-
larly affected by such behaviour are those in which costs are incurred in the
short term but benefits appear only in the long term, such as AIDS prevention
or environmental policies. This article sheds additional light on the matter by
bringing findings from fieldwork in several provinces of China to bear on the
28 Olson 1993, 568.
29 Wright 2008; Dionne 2011.
30 Dionne 2011, 56.
31 Wright 2008.
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question of how frequent cadre turnover affects implementation of environmental
policies.
Characteristics of environmental policy
Environmental policies have a number of distinctive characteristics that tend to
make implementation difficult. Many environmental policies are characterized
by a time lag such that costs are incurred in the short term but benefits only
materialize in the long run. Whereas building a waste-water management facility
might provide results within three years, the fruits of many policies in the envir-
onmental field, for example the reduction of greenhouse gases, are only realized
many years, or even decades, hence. Compared to many other policy fields, envir-
onmental policies also have the disadvantage that policy outcomes are not always
visible and easily measureable. But there is, of course, variation across environ-
mental issues in this regard: whereas reforestation projects produce unambiguous,
visible results, the results of carbon intensity reduction are less visible and less
readily measurable. Environmental policies also often involve stark trade-offs
against economic growth.32 For instance, China’s recent “green” plans call on
local governments to restructure their economies towards a more diversified,
greener industrial structure. Local foot-dragging results from leaders’ reluctance
to impose high costs on local businesses and depress local employment in the
short term. In addition, restructuring the economy is a lengthy and uncertain pro-
cess. A leader’s efforts will take years to come to fruition and they cannot be
assured that the new cleaner industries receiving investment today will thrive
tomorrow. Finally, environmental policy implementation is frequently hampered
by organizational challenges. Many environmental policies touch on diverse issue
fields that require the cooperation of different functional departments. Also, the
units of environmental protection such as lakes, rivers or wetlands are complete
ecosystems that span discrete administrative units. In these conditions, varying
levels of economic development, in particular, tend to inhibit cooperation on
environmental protection across localities.
Effects of Cadre Rotation on Environmental Policy Implementation in
China
While the political rationale behind high cadre turnover is clear, there has, to
date, been little empirical work carried out on the effects of the system on envir-
onmental policy implementation. Previous work and interviews with current or
retired cadres reveal a complex picture showing both pros and cons to cadre rota-
tion schemes. In the following sections, we discuss our findings on the most
important advantages and disadvantages of frequent post-shuffling among
local cadres.
32 Matland 1995.
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Pros of the Cadre Turnover System
Short leadership cycles can aid the implementation of environmental policies in
certain ways. Frequent post-shuffling among local cadres helps to reduce the
institutional cleavages and bureaucratic fragmentation that tend to inhibit envir-
onmental policy implementation.
Bridging horizontal gaps: improved coordination among departments
Recent rotation schemes have helped to bridge departmental gulfs, an eternal
problem in China’s huge and fragmented bureaucracy. Cadres who rotate
through departments within their locality are thought to develop a deeper knowl-
edge of the particularistic bureaucratic interests and policy priorities of different
local departments. Gaining an understanding of the policy mandates of particu-
lar agencies and forging cross-departmental networks can help local leaders iden-
tify areas of common interest and aid the formation of formal or informal “green
coalitions.” Such networks can also be helpful in the process of policy implemen-
tation. For example, according to EPB officials working in a county in northern
Shanxi, the EPB head’s prior work experience in the coal management bureau
(mei guan ju 煤管局) brought “additional guanxi 关系 (personal connections)
and enterprise knowledge. Our leader understands how to deal with big coal-
mines and he knows the mine owners very well. His previous experience also
helped the EPB to establish a very good working relationship with the coal man-
agement bureau.”33 Such coordination between departmental bureaucratic inter-
ests is especially important in environmental policy implementation, which often
requires more than ten departments to work jointly on a particular issue.
Bridging vertical gaps: transfer of resources, knowledge and policy support
Many rotation schemes employ cadre exchange also as a means of shortening
vertical administrative hierarchies. In 2010, for example, Heilongjiang province
rolled out a programme to increase rotation between provincial, municipal and
county-level cadres in order to improve information flows downwards and
upwards. In its first year, 100 cadres from local levels were posted to provincial
offices and the province sent 110 cadres down to local positions. Many EPBs
across China have also launched similar rotation schemes across administrative
levels. In Wenshan 文山 prefecture in Yunnan, for instance, two thirds of all
cadres in the EPB undergo rotation. By exchanging county and municipal EPB
cadres for a minimum of a six-month period, the programme intends to smooth
environmental policy implementation by enhancing communication across
33 INT10_09092011. To protect the anonymity of interviewees, interview sources are coded throughout
this article. Detailed information about interviews and fieldwork is available upon request from the
authors.
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administrative levels and improving cadres’ knowledge of the upper or lower gov-
ernments’ daily environmental tasks.
Circulating cadres between different administrative levels also channels scarce
resources to localities to aid environmental implementation.34 A government offi-
cial who had previously worked at the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing
explained how his networks in Beijing helped a municipal city win a coveted
model environmental city designation:
While working as a vice-mayor in a municipality in Zhejiang, I served as an important link to
the central government. Municipal leaders had declared, as one of their five-year plan goals,
to obtain the national title of a “model environmental city” (huanbao mofan chengshi 环保模
范城市). They had completed all the paperwork and fulfilled all criteria, but with hundreds of
cities applying for the title at the same time, the municipality could have waited a long time
for inspection and a final decision. To speed up the process and to ensure that the municipal-
ity got the title, I went to Beijing and talked to the Ministry of Environment. I convinced
them that comprehensive plans were behind the municipality’s application. At the Ministry
of Environment, they took me seriously because I previously worked as a mid-level civil ser-
vant in the Ministry of Commerce. I was familiar with the procedures and regulations and the
Ministry of Environmental “gave me face.” In the end, the municipality got the title quickly,
which in turn meant fulfilling its five-year objectives plus having access to additional
finance.35
Fieldwork provided numerous additional examples of how local cadres’ personal
networks established in previous posts proved critical to attracting investors and
securing project funding. Provincial cadres also gain from personal networks
linking them to municipal and county leaders. One official working at the
Anhui provincial government recalled how “having worked as a vice-mayor
made it easier for me to convince leaders from the same municipality to join
our provincial pilot programme aimed at restructuring local economies because
they trusted me. While working together, communicating with municipal leaders
was also much simpler because I was so familiar with the municipality.”36
Bridging regional gaps: dissemination of ideas and information
Cadre rotation also helps with the dissemination of innovative implementation
methods. Leading cadres are frequently posted to a different locality at the
same administrative level.37 Many localities in China are searching for alterna-
tives to energy-intensive or resource-reliant economic development models and
look to seconded leaders for ideas. For example, in 2008, it became clear that
Datong 大同, a coal-mining municipality in northern Shanxi, urgently needed
to restructure its economy as it was running out of coal. Among different restruc-
turing alternatives, developing the tourism sector was seen to be a feasible
34 INT31_29092011.
35 INT05_08092011.
36 INT141_11022007.
37 For example, of 898 municipal Party secretaries newly appointed during 1993–2011, 14% of them were
already working as municipal Party secretaries in their previous work positions, but in a different
locality.
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strategy. Accordingly, provincial leaders appointed a new municipal mayor in
2008, Geng Yanbo 耿彦波, with a proven track record of transforming local
economies by building up tourism.38 Before being appointed mayor, Geng had
successfully restructured other cities in Shanxi by developing tourism,39 and
according to a staff member in the local leadership group in Datong, Geng’s
previous successes and experience helped him to persuade other leaders in
Datong to support his plan to promote the city’s cultural riches in order to attract
tourism.40
Government–enterprise links: relationships and building alliances
Job rotations through SOEs and bureaucracies can also aid the enforcement of
environmental regulations. Of the 31 provincial EPB heads in 2011, 19 per
cent had at some point worked for an SOE.41 For example, prior to taking
up his government post, the Jiangxi EPB head had forged his career in a pro-
vincial chemical SOE, beginning as a factory assistant and eventually rising to
become chairman of the board. The cross-sector work experiences of depart-
mental heads improve information flows between state-owned businesses and
government sectors and provide government leaders with key management
and negotiation skills. For instance, prior to his appointment, the head of
the economic commission in Datong municipality had worked as the chief
manager of a state-owned enterprise and also in the local state-owned assets
supervision and administration commission. His background proved to be
very helpful in his current position as “he is very skilled in dealing with
SOEs.”42
Such informal linkages between local cadres and SOEs can aid effective envir-
onmental management in China. In the context of the immense difficulties pre-
sented by regulation and supervision of enterprises, cadres’ insider knowledge
can reduce information asymmetries between regulator and the regulated. In add-
ition, since formal incentives such as national subsidies for energy or emission
savings are often insufficient in themselves to change enterprise behaviour, cadres
often need to persuade local enterprises of the benefits of energy and emission
savings through unofficial means such as personal appeals, or to furnish side pay-
ments outside the formal implementation structure.43 During such informal
negotiations, government officials with prior work experience at an SOE can
draw from their knowledge of enterprises’ decision-making processes and internal
politics.
38 INT02_01092011.
39 For example, in Lingshi, where Geng was vice-Party secretary and then mayor (1993–2000), one major
project was the restoration of the Wang Family Mansion. In Yuci (2000–2006), Geng presided over a
large number of construction projects in order to promote tourism (INT37_16072010).
40 INT02_01092011.
41 Kostka 2013.
42 INT22_23092011.
43 Kostka and Hobbs 2012.
Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? 371
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000356
16 Aug 2017 at 12:13:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library and Information Services - Hertie School of Governence, on
Cons of the Cadre Turnover System
There are also significant downsides to the rotation system in its current form.
As outsiders sent to a post for three or four years, leading cadres face severe
time pressures to deliver quick results. Their lack of local knowledge and per-
sonal contacts can make it difficult to craft effective implementation plans. In
addition, the initiatives developed by local leaders can sometimes reflect lea-
ders’ particularist interests in promotion more than the objective needs of the
locality.
Roving bandits: self-maximizing and rent-seeking
Our research suggests that Olson’s insights are applicable to China: short tenure
cycles do incentivize cadres to prioritize short-term over long-term gains. Such
“roving bandit” behaviour was, for example, apparent in Datong municipality
prior to the arrival of Mayor Geng Yanbo in 2008. Datong had had a run of
unremarkable leaders who stayed an average of 2.9 years and who did little to
end the city’s heavy dependence on the coal industry. One well-placed city official
described how the leaders used their time in Datong primarily as an opportunity
for career advancement:
Usually, the previous leaders stayed for a couple of years and then found a chance to get pro-
moted. They used Datong as a springboard. The Party secretary of Datong is a position from
which it’s easy to get promoted because there are many coal bosses here. That means they can
get a lot of bribes and use them to bribe the upper-level government to get promoted. They
didn’t even need any political achievements to prove themselves… None of them made any dif-
ference. When they left, Datong was the same as when they came. For them, all was good so
long as no major problems arose.44
Alongside bribes from coal bosses, kickbacks for illegal real estate construction
apparently provided further sources of income to buy promotions in the provin-
cial capital city.45
Implementation outcomes were disappointing under the leadership of
Datong’s “roving bandits.” These leaders failed to develop any strategies to
reduce the heavy environmental toll of the city’s coal mining activities, or
indeed reduce reliance on the coal industry despite rapidly dwindling supplies
of marketable coal. By 2008, national guidelines mandating coal-mining restruc-
turing had not been implemented, the city lacked a strategy for a long-term
viable economic growth path, and air and water pollution caused by the pre-
dominance of coal in Datong’s industrial structure was so severe that Datong
was said to wear a “black hat” (hei maozi 黑帽子) for environmental degrad-
ation. On the whole, these leaders successfully extracted rents from local indus-
tries but did not undertake the painful restructuring so urgently needed by the
city.
44 INT34_30092011.
45 INT34_30092011.
372 The China Quarterly, 218, June, 2014, pp. 359–380
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000356
16 Aug 2017 at 12:13:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library and Information Services - Hertie School of Governence, on
Focus on short-term, visible results
While such “roving bandits” are probably more the exception than the rule, state
officials are nevertheless increasingly concerned about “short-termism” at local
levels. China’s cadre management system should, in theory, curtail such preda-
tory behaviour and encourage local officials not to neglect environmental issues
by assessing their performance against standards set by upper-level authorities.
However, recent public commentary suggests that short-termism associated
with high cadre turnover is a significant and growing problem for environmental
governance in China. The short tenure of leaders, combined with a general pref-
erence for costly show projects (which often create rent streams for local offi-
cials), leads to short-sighted behaviour and can inhibit the formation of
long-term sustainable development plans. As one commentator in a prominent
Party journal put it:
[T]here are some cadres who, because they know there is a “when the time comes, they’ll move
on” guarantee, give weight to “apparent accomplishments” (xianji 显绩) and much less to
“potential accomplishments” (qianji 潜绩). They place less emphasis on foundational, long-
term, strategic work and pursue short term, false political accomplishments.46
As discussed in more detail below, Party and government leaders have recently
begun to think of ways to motivate local officials to prioritize “foundational,
long-term, strategic work.”
Incentives in the cadre evaluation system interact with the typically short time
horizons of local leaders and predispose them to select the path of least resistance
in implementation of environmental initiatives. By contrast, environmental pro-
jects which are not seen to enhance a cadre’s chances of promotion and which
take a long time to produce results will tend to be ranked at the bottom of the
prioritization list. As such, cadres’ incentives to secure short-term goals can be
at odds with the centre’s expansive green growth mandate and many environmen-
tal projects that are not realizable in the short term are sidelined. For instance,
many leaders have invested significant resources in tree planting in order to
meet their annual forest coverage targets in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans
(FYP), an initiative that produces quick and visible results, but many of them
have delayed economic restructuring as it is a difficult and complex process
that can take years to bear fruit.
Interviews revealed a number of other negative, unintended consequences of a
system in which leading cadres are pressurized to deliver visible and measurable
environmental outcomes within their short tenure. For instance, the EPB head in
a Shandong county pointed out that the incentive for visible and measurable
results can lead to wasteful misallocation of resources:
In order to further reduce chemical oxygen demand in the 12th FYP, our county is planning to
build one sewage treatment plant for each town. Personally, I do not think that this is a good
idea. It would be better to expand the existing sewage plant and build a better pipe network to
collect wastewater rather than build many small plants in each town. This would be less
46 Yi 2007.
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expensive. For some towns, it is also not financially feasible for them to build their own treat-
ment plants and their township government will face severe financial burdens in the future. But,
this is a political problem. Some leaders think that building a sewage treatment plant for each
town sounds better and provides more political accomplishment value. In the short term, the
plans sound impressive to their superiors, but the next leaders inherit these financial burdens
and have to deal with failures as not every town will be able to complete the constructions.47
The short time horizons of cadres can also lead to a cavalier attitude to costs since
leaders can expect to be onto their next assignments by the time the bill comes.
For instance, aside from the inherent risks of Geng Yanbo’s all-in tourism-based
strategy, the mayor’s successors will inherit huge amounts of municipal debt.
Under the pressure of a de facto five-year term limit, Geng launched many initia-
tives almost immediately upon taking office and project financing has been
pieced together in an ad hoc fashion. Enterprise investment has played only a
minor role in Datong’s transformation so far, with the majority of project finan-
cing coming from land sales and bank loans. Typical of his “can’t wait” (deng bu
qi 等不起) attitude, Geng’s response to questions raised about the city’s construc-
tion projects being plagued by legal violations was: “I do not have time to wait,
so demolition cannot wait.”48 Some funding for cultural restoration projects has
come from the central and provincial governments, but money for a huge city
wall construction project has been drawn exclusively from municipal finances.49
The final tab for these projects may total 50 billion yuan, a vast sum considering
that Datong municipality’s revenue came to only 14 billion yuan in 2010.
Revenue shortfalls have been made up with bank loans, land sales and high ticket
prices for the refurbished sites. Geng has, reportedly, begun to run out of credit
with local banks and the word in Datong officialdom is that “Geng cannot get a
loan” (Geng ban buliao daikuan耿办不了贷款). Geng’s successor will be saddled
with the costs of this “big-bang” style of industrial restructuring.
Leaders’ short time horizons also create problems for the environmental plan-
ning system. An official in Chenzhou郴州 noted that the short time span given to
cadres has forced a change in the allocation of energy intensity targets in local
five-year plans:
Owing to political cycles, leaders sometimes select lower energy saving targets at the beginning
of a five-year period because they will only stay in the locality for two more years and leave the
problem for the next leader. This is also one of the reasons why the emphasis has shifted from
five-year targets in the 11th FYP to annual targets in the 12th FYP.50
Short office tenures also affect the quality of environmental policy implementa-
tion. Many of the environmental targets in the 11th FYP were implemented at
the eleventh hour and did not yield lasting change. In some localities, mandatory
energy intensity targets were only met at the very end of the planning period
47 INT16_14052012.
48 Xin Jing bao. 2011. “Shi zhang ‘deng bu qi,’ ze qiang chai ting buxia” (Mayor will not stop demolitions),
22 May, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2011-05/22/c_121443752.htm. Accessed 4 February 2013.
49 INT34_30092011.
50 INT6_22052012.
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using extreme, and sometimes socially harmful, measures. These included cutting
electricity to hospitals, homes and rural villages. Local governments also tempor-
arily shut down energy-intensive companies for a given period of time only to
allow the same enterprises to re-open, a method known as “sleeping manage-
ment” (xiumian guanli 休眠管理).51 These low-quality implementation
approaches ensured that leading cadres met the energy intensity target outlined
in their individual responsibility contracts, but effectively put off the difficult
matter of how localities can find more long-term energy efficient solutions.
New lords, new laws
Institutionalized post-shuffling of local leading cadres can result in damaging dis-
continuity in local sustainable development initiatives. Local officials who are
self-maximizing may prefer to gain exclusive credit for successful initiatives rather
than share the glory with successors and predecessors. This can result in adverse
effects for local green growth when newly-posted cadres indiscriminately stop
existing initiatives, regardless of their merits, in order to place their own stamp
on a locality in accord with the tradition of “new lords, new laws” (xin guan
xin fa 新管新法).
Leadership discontinuity often comes along with policy uncertainties and “pol-
icy freezes.” For instance, there have been 13 changes of Party secretaries
between 2000 and 2010 in Baoding 保定, a municipality in Hebei province,
and each leadership change was accompanied by departments in the city taking
a “wait and see” approach, “trying to decipher signs from the new leader(s) and
determine in which direction the wind will below ( feng wang nali chui 风往哪里
吹).”52 With the installation of every new leader, important environmental policy
decisions were put on hold, resulting in transition periods of months or even a
year.53 As a result, local officials working at the departmental level in Baoding
complained that policy meddling from their constantly changing superiors in
the city government prevented them from achieving any kind of coherence in
their policies.54
Baoding is by no means an exception. The case of Datong’s maverick mayor
described above is also illustrative of the practice of “new lords, new laws.”
Soon after taking office, Geng let it be known that he would play by different
rules. A government official recalls one of Geng’s first new measures:
When Geng first arrived in Datong, he called a halt to all the real estate projects that did not
meet construction standards. Real estate developers interpreted this as a sign that Geng wanted
bribes, but they were wrong. Geng directed his subordinates to take the money they offered him
and deposit it in a special government fund used for city construction.55
51 Kostka and Hobbs 2012.
52 INT04_11092011; Shin Forthcoming.
53 INT04_11092011.
54 Shin Forthcoming.
55 INT34_30092011.
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This demonstrates that, as outsiders, newly appointed leaders can break with
existing patterns and habits. As discussed above, Geng subsequently consolidated
the coal industry and initiated a large-scale restructuring programme to develop a
non-coal industry based on tourism. While many credit Geng with laying a firm
foundation for Datong’s industrial transformation, it remains to be seen whether
this greening growth strategy is in fact viable and whether the next leader will fol-
low Geng’s vision of tourism development or select a different focus.
Leadership changes at the departmental level can be equally disruptive. A
high-ranking official in the Datong government described how ongoing projects
can be indiscriminately stopped because of the arrival of a new departmental
head:
If a leader changes, he or she may have different priorities and stop the work already begun.
For example, I worked for a year and half on a project that included a lot of background
research and discussion with different partners and it was almost completed … Then there
was a change of leader in the commission who thought this project was not promising and
put a stop to it.56
Coupled with the focus on short-term results, the tradition of new lords, new laws
contributes to a structural bias against faithful implementation of policies with
long-term objectives.
Constraint on implementation capacities: limited local knowledge and networks
Cadre rotation can also impact environmental policy implementation in more
prosaic ways. In the space of a three or four-year tenure, circulating officials
spend much of their time simply getting up to speed in their new localities.
Zhong offers a pointed description of the problem:
It usually takes key county or township/town officials one or two years to settle in, familiarize
themselves with the environment and various governmental agencies under their jurisdiction,
and establish smooth working relationships with colleagues and subordinates. It probably
takes the same amount of time, if not longer, to study and develop a new comprehensive eco-
nomic development plan for the locale.57
In an average tenure period, potentially more than half of a leader’s time could be
taken up with getting to know the lay of the land and gaining the trust of subor-
dinates. Since cadres only have a small window in which to familiarize themselves
with a new area, their implementation capacity might be constrained by limited
knowledge of local circumstances. Some officials reported that newcomers some-
times made overblown promises as a result. In Chenzhou, a local cadre com-
plained: “Sometimes, local leaders do not do deep research about their
localites. Instead, they set even higher targets compared to the ones received
from the upper level in order to impress their superiors. But these targets are
not suitable and not realistic for the locality.”58
56 INT34_30092011.
57 Zhong 2003, 119.
58 INT21_28052012.
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The few localities that are exceptions to the rule of rapid leader turnover also
illustrate the salience of leaders’ time horizons and their effect on cadres’ local
knowledge and networks. Xiaoyi 孝义 county in northern Shanxi is one such
place. Like Datong, Xiaoyi is a resource-based economy with a coal-dependent
industrial structure in the midst of transformation. In contrast to Datong’s rushed
implementation approach to economic transformation, Xiaoyi’s greening growth
strategy has built up gradually with guidance from a strong and locally-rooted
leadership group. Recent Party secretaries in Xiaoyi have served for an average
of 8.3 years, and mayors an average 6.2 years, much longer than the average ten-
ure of local leaders.59 This high degree of continuity in the local leadership group
has helped Xiaoyi’s leaders to stay focused on transforming the local economy
over the last decade. According to one former deputy mayor, leadership continu-
ity has given local development a stepwise quality:
The worst thing for a local government is frequent change in the leadership group and planning.
In Xiaoyi, the mayor will usually become the next Party secretary so the top leaders of the two
terms are old partners, meaning there is good continuity. Also, every new period the leaders are
doing better. The mayor and Party secretary in the 1990s built roads to connect Xiaoyi with the
outside. The next leaders started industrial restructuring. The current Party secretary has placed
greater emphasis on equitable growth and environment as well. Each period’s achievements
serve as inspiration for the next.60
This continuity has helped Xiaoyi’s leadership group make very effective use of
the relationships it has built over time with upper levels of government, and espe-
cially with local industry. These precious guanxi resources are effectively pre-
served over time since long-serving mayors typically become long-serving Party
secretaries in Xiaoyi. Consistent leadership helped the city win national awards
and secure planning support from upper levels since stability meant follow-
through on policy priorities and the absence of “new lords, new laws” problems.
For instance, in 2002 the Xiaoyi leadership fixed on the goal of obtaining a
central-level experimental city designation (shidian chengshi 试点城市) to aid
their economic transformation. Local leaders were first dispatched to learn
from experimental cities in the north-east in preparation for their application.
After seven years of careful project development and implementation, Xiaoyi
was finally named a “Resource-exhausted transformation experimental city” in
2009, one of only 44 nationwide and the only one in Shanxi. This title is not
just an accolade for the city’s leaders; it has also brought the city 200 million
yuan in central government funding.61
Xiaoyi’s leadership group has also used its guanxi ties to induce local busi-
nesses to share the burden of reducing Xiaoyi’s economic dependence on coal.
Strikingly, local coal enterprises, many of which are privately owned, have actu-
ally been given soft targets in local plans for investment in economic
59 Xiaoyi county leaders’ tenure times are twice the average of other leading county cadres in the same
municipality; Party secretaries in other counties in Lüliang stayed an average of 3.6 years (N = 28)
and mayors an average of 3.1 years (N = 35).
60 INT15_21092011.
61 INT11_26092011.
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transformation projects: “Coal production enterprises should each launch non-
coal projects of between one and two billion RMB; each coking enterprise should
launch projects of one billion RMB or more in non-coal or downstream process-
ing projects.”62 In addition, Xiaoyi leaders have effectively “bundled” coal
restructuring with the goal of developing non-coal industries by providing incen-
tives for former coal bosses whose enterprises were eliminated as part of a 2006
industry clean-up to start greener businesses. For instance, with government
backing, a former mine owner whose enterprise was closed down brought a
Walmart outlet to Xiaoyi and has also set up a new business marketing agricul-
tural products. Leadership continuity likely contributed to the leaders’ success in
securing investment because investors can be confident that plans will not shift
radically with personnel changes in the leadership group.
Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence gathered in interviews suggests that, while cadre rotation has some
benefits for environmental policy implementation, high cadre turnover has gen-
erated significant negative and unintended consequences. We find that cadre
rotation affects both cadres’ incentives and their implementation capacities. In
terms of incentives, shuffling cadres around every three to four years keeps offi-
cials’ feet to the fire, as they are required to report accomplishments regularly to
superiors. Yet, as with leaders in Dionne’s study of HIV/AIDS policy, Chinese
leaders with short time horizons tend to select cheap and quick approaches to
environmental policy implementation. All else being equal, they prefer short-term
highly visible projects that yield outcomes during their own tenure periods, while
long-term, costly and complex initiatives are often sidelined. As mentioned, state
leaders are increasingly concerned about short-termism and local leaders them-
selves see the constraints of this system. For example, Geng Yanbo demanded
a five-year term in Datong so that he could make significant changes and receive
credit for them. One informant told us: “When Geng was working in Taiyuan as
vice-mayor [2006–2008] and he knew he was going to be sent elsewhere, he
demanded to be stationed in Datong for at least five years, otherwise he would
not want to go. He wanted to make a long-term impact and be a leader with
vision.”63
While the effect of frequent rotation on officials’ incentive structures is prob-
lematic, the implications for cadres’ implementation capacity is more mixed.
On the one hand, by frequently moving them around departments and regions,
cadres can play a role in the dissemination of new ideas and resources. Cadres
with previous work experience in SOEs are well-placed to negotiate effectively
with managers the implementation of onerous environmental regulations. On
the other hand, cadres who come in as outsiders to a new locality lack the
62 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (Xiaoyi Government Work Report), 24 June 2011, 20.
63 INT2_01092011.
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local knowledge and networks essential for drawing local businesses into greener
growth initiatives or for obtaining additional funding from provincial and central
governments. When local leaders have attained sufficient understanding of local
conditions and interests to serve as effective leaders, it is already time to take up a
new post elsewhere.
How might China’s policymakers rectify the adverse effects of high cadre turn-
over highlighted in our interviews? This is a complex question deserving of its
own paper; our analysis suggests that national leaders could strive to increase
local cadres’ time horizons. A step forward in this regard was the central govern-
ment’s 2006 “Interim provisions on the tenure of leading Party and government
cadres,”64 which stipulates that, except in special cases, leading cadres ought to
serve out their five-year terms in full. Short-termism associated with “tenure
rush” (gan renqi 赶任期) prompted the Guangdong provincial Party committee
in 2011 to remind local leaders that “success does not have to be realized in
my tenure” (gongcheng bu bi zai wo renqi功成不必在我任期).65 In spite of recent
national calls to adhere strictly to the recommended five-year rules, there has not
yet been a discernible impact on official tenures at the provincial and municipal
level; indeed, the current trend is towards faster turnover of officials.
In all, the considerable perverse effects of local officials’ short time horizons
give reason to doubt the more optimistic claims about China’s version of envir-
onmental authoritarianism. The purported authoritarian advantage is that, in
comparison to their counterparts in democratic systems, eco-elites enjoy greater
freedom of action owing to their relative autonomy from interest groups and
secure positions in power. Our analysis suggests that behaviour linked to leaders’
short time horizons serves to undermine any such potential advantage. Local lea-
ders under pressure to produce “political achievements” in a few short years tend
to select the path of least resistance in selecting quick, low-quality approaches to
implementing environmental policies and, while nominally following national
directives, are actually putting off the difficult business of creating a sustainable
growth path.
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